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AT LOGGERHEADS: THE SUPREME COURT AND RACIAL EQUALITY IN
PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION AFFER MISSOURI V. JENKINS
Roberta M. Harding'

I.

INTRODUCTION

June 12th of 1995 marked a somber occasion in the
annals of school desegregation litigation. On that day,
the United States Supreme Court sent disturbing messages in its opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins.2 The Court's
decision hinders achievement of the objective of school
desegregation litigation-providing equal educational opportunities for African-American public school children-and detrimentally impacts other substantive areas of civil rights litigation.
This article examines what I believe are several important general consequences of Jenkins'sthe impairment
of a trial judge's discretionary equitable remedial powers; the Court's establishment of a new agenda that sacrifices the interests of African-American school children,
the plaintiffs in equal education litigation; and how defendants in such cases are now rewarded for their failure to rectify constitutional wrongs. The Article begins
by briefly reviewing relevant portions of desegregation
jurisprudence. This review is followed by a summation
of the action brought by the plaintiffs in Jenkins, and a
discussion of the remedies selected by the district court.
Finally, this article analyzes the general ramifications of
the Court's decision.

A. Brown v. Board of Education
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Brown v. Board of Education.3 Brown I decided
the issue of whether African-American public school
children must have educational opportunities equiva-4
lent to those available to other public school children.
The Court held that equal educational opportunities
must be made available to all public school children.' In
making this decision, the Court rejected the application
of the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine6 to public
schools by concluding that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."'
Consequently, defendants' institutionalized racial discriminatory practices violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
A critical aspect of the Court's pronouncement in
Brown I was its acknowledgment of the dual nature of
the harm or injury sustained by the plaintiffs through
unconstitutional racial discrimination in educational
practices. The Court noted that the scope of the harm
encompassed not only tangible, but also intangible factors.9 This acknowledgment was not unprecedented. If
anything, recognition of the "intangible" harm caused
by this type of constitutional violation was consistent
with the Court's earlier decisions in Sweatt v. Painter0
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2115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).The decision was 5-4, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist writing the majority opinion. Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion which reversed the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of the District Court's remedial orders that were the
subject of the controversy. Id. at 2042, 2056. Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Id. at 2042.
3347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter"Brown I"]. Several companion cases were consolidated with Brown L See id. at 486
n.1.

4Id. at

487-88. Previously the Court addressed the same

issue but in the context of educational opportunities on the
graduate and professional levels. See Sweatt v.Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950)(holding that a black student has the right to a
"legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to stu-

and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.'I

In Sweatt, the Court found that the refusal of Texas
to admit a black student to.the University of Texas Law
dents of other races'l(emphasis added); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950)(holding that a black
student has the right to graduate educational opportunities
equal to those of other students). See infra pp. 26-27.
-'BrownI, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
6This doctrine was originally adopted by the Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537(1896). Plessy addressed the
issue of the constitutionality of racially segregated railroad
passenger cars. In order to uphold segregation, the Court "formally" recognized the "separate but equal" doctrine. Id.
7Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
'Id. The Court later relied upon the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause to extend Brown I's holding to the maintenance of segregated public schools in the District of Columbia. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
9Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492-94. The Court noted that its
decision could not rest solely upon the enumeration and comparison of tangible factors, such as the physical plant and the
curriculum, but must"look instead to the effect of segregation
itself on public education." Id. at 492.
0339 U.S. 629 (1950).

"339 U.S. 637 (1950).

School violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.' 2 The Court also found that simply providing an alternative law school for students of color did
not adequately and effectively remedy the harm incurred
from the constitutional violation.' 3 In reaching this decision, and in its accompanying discussion about the
nature of the harm stemming from the disparate education, the Court noted that disparity in educational opportunities included"those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."' 4 McLaurin reveals a similar appreciation of the intangible harm done to individuals
who are denied equal educational opportunities simply
because their skin happens to be the wrong color. In
McLaurin, the Court found that the restrictions placed
upon the petitioner by the State "impair[ed] and
inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." s The Court summed it up
nicely by stating that "his training is unequal to that of
6
his classmates."'
Following the lead of Sweatt and McLaurin, the
Brown I Court expands on the pivotal role that intangible factors play in providing the requisite relief for the
evils of segregation:
Today, education isperhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtfid that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education."

"2 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36.
131d. at 635.
14Id. at 634. Such "intangible" factors included the inability to obtain the prestige gained from attending the University
of Texas Law School and the lack of access to preeminent faculty members at the University of Texas facility. Id. at 632-35.
1sMcLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.

Thus, the emphasis placed on intangibles in Brown I
coupled with appreciation of their significance in Sweatt
and McLaurin evidences the important role intangible
factors occupy in providing a suitable and effective remedy to segregation. Specifically, a remedy that places the
plaintiffs, the Aflican-American public school aged children, in their rightful position-obtaining an equal education.' Accordingly, the Brown I Court recognized and
anticipated that the remedial portion of Brown I would
necessarily address both the tangible and intangible facets of the constitutional harm of segregation.
In Brown I, the Court did not attempt to tackle the
complex task of identifying and enumerating the intangible and tangible factors that would have to be considered in formulating an effective remedy. 9 Instead, the
Court restored the remedial issue to the docket and allowed argument on the issue. 20 The Court did, however,
acknowledge that any remedy would be intricate because the nature of the violation required a significant
restructuring of the existing racially segregated public
school systems.2' Implicit in this comment is the Court's
acceptance of the substantial probability that it would
be necessary for courts to resort to elaborate and novel
equitable remedies in order to provide effective relief to
the victims of segregation in public schools.
B. The Remedy
The focal point of Brown 1 was the determination
of "the manner in which relief [was] to be accorded." 22
The Court's central concern was in ensuring that the
plaintiffs received a remedy that would correct the wrong
done to them. Accordingly, it was the interests of the
plaintiffs and not those of the defendants that were to
be the focus in the formulation of a remedy. In addition
to this underlying remedial principle, the Court provided
specific directives pertaining to the creation of an effective remedy. These directives included: "fully" remedying the wrong;2 4 tailoring the remedies to address the
26
diverse local problems;25 instituting complex remedies;
vesting the trial courts in the original cases with the re-

being able to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students of other races. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641
(1950)).
2
"Id. at 495.
21Id.
22 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298

16Id.
17 Brown

(1955) (hereinafter "Brown II1.

18 A

interest of the plaintiffs").
24
d. at 299.
25
d.
26 d.

1,347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
remedy's purpose is to "make whole the victims of
unlawful conduct." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,280 n. 15
(1977).

19 Although the Court did not attempt to list the intangible factors, it did note that intangible factors could include

3 Id.

at 300 (concluding that "[a)t stake is the personal

sponsibility for formulating a complete remedy;27 and
using equitable principles to guide the formation of the
remedies. 28

One of the most significant directives is the Court's
decision to rely upon local trial courts to devise and carry
out the remedy. It was decided that because "of their
proximity to local conditions,"trial courts will be most
familiar with the parties.z9 Thus, local courts are in the
best position to evaluate the situation and construct the
most suitable means for fully remedying the wrong done
to the plaintiffs.
In Brown I, the Court noted that the harm stemming from denyingAfrican-American public school children possessed intangible components. 30 By expressly
noting that traditional equitable principles should be
used, 31 the Court reassures the courts responsible for
overseeing the achievement of Brown I's mandate that
they would be afforded all the flexibility and accommodation historically associated with using remedial tools
grounded in equity in order to address these intangibles.
Thus, it was envisioned that the specific terms of the
remedial schemes would include the means of remedying the intangible harms associated with being denied
the chance to receive equal educational opportunities.
Of course, since one feature that contributed to the unequal educational situation was the existence of racially
segregated schools sanctioned by state laws and constitutions, the Court's first task was to dismantle this tangible feature that thwarted black children's ability to
receive an equal education.
C_ Post-BrownJurisprudencein Equal Education
Opportunities
After its decision in Brown I, the Court has often
revisited the issue of eliminating racial discrimination in
public schools in order to provide equal educational
opportunities to all students. The decision rendered in
Green v. County School Board32 confirmed several of the
directives advanced in Brown I. First, the Court reaffirmed that the district courts were entrusted with the

27

Id.

28

Id.at 300.
2Id.at 299.
30Brown
I, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
31
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
32391 U.S. 430 (1968).
33
Id. at 439.
34 /d.
at 437 (emphasis added).
3S1d.
at 436-42.
36
d. at 438-39.
37
Id. at 435, 438.
38
Id. at 438.
39

Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).

responsibility of developing and implementing effective
remedies that provided plaintiffs with the relief to which
they were entitled.3 3 Evidence of the pivotal role played
by district courts is the Court's continued observance
that: "Brown II was a call for the dismantling of wellentrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that
complex and multifaceted problems would arise which
would require time and flexibility for a successful reso34
lution."
In addition to defining the district court's role in
the desegregation process, the Green Court reemphasized that the prevailing interest was that of securing
the plaintiffs' relief 35 The Court also admonished the
defendants for not following the "deliberate speed" directive of Brown I1. 5s The Court noted that fourteen years

had passed since its decision in Brown I and the plaintiffs' situation remained unremedied.3 7 Delays of this
length were "no longer tolerable."38 In reprimanding the
defendant, the Court "strongly encouraged" the school
board "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now.'0 9 Lastly, the Court identified educational faculty
and staff as appropriate factors to be incorporated into
40
remedial schemes.
The Court's unanimous decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education4' clarified several
important components of Brown I's edict. First, the Court
reemphasized the dual nature of the constitutional harm:
the tangible and the intangible.42 This was accomplished
by specifically noting that"[t]he objective today remains
to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of stateimposed segregation." 43 These "vestiges of segregation"
that perpetuate the disparity in educational opportunities are equivalent to the intangible harms acknowledged
by the Court in Sweatt,44 McLaurin,4s and Brown L46 The

Swann Court also stressed the need for flexible parameters if the trial courts were going to satisfy the general
remedial objective set forth in Brown 1I.4'For example,

the Court noted that in formulating an appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs "[t]he remedy for such segregation
may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and

40

Id. at 435. The important role played by the teaching
staff in providing an equal education was originally raised in
Sweatt. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-34. In addition, Brown II discusses the probability that the personnel at educational facilities would be addressed when considering remedial options.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.

41402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court acknowledged that one
of its goals was to "try to amplify guidelines" for the implementation
of the remedial portion of Brown L Id. at 14.
42 d. at 15.
43
Id. at 15.
44Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-34.
4
sMcLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640-42.
46
Brown 1,347 U.S. at 493-94.
47
Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.

even bizarrein some situations and may impose burdens
on some."48 This passage illustrates the Court's anticipation that trial courts would be compelled to impose what
some might consider novel remedial measures in order
to fulfill the obligations conferred upon them in Brown
I. The Swann Court also reiterated the Green Court's
recognition of the vital connection between support
49
personnel and the goal of achieving parity in education.
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted the conclusion that
the proper staffing of public educational facilities is an
integral feature of a multifaceted remedy designed to
eliminate the disparity in education.
Perhaps most indicative of the Swann Court's encouragement that trial courts seek and adopt creative
remedies, is the emphasis placed on the trial court's historically broad and flexible powers in equity to fashion
the necessary relief. In fact, one of the issues before the
Court was the scope of the lower courts' powers to fashion remedies to eliminate racially discriminatory public
schools.5 0 Although the Brown II Court unambiguously
announced that trial courts responsible for attaining compliance with Brown I would have the benefit of broad
and flexible equitable powers, the Swann Court evidently
believed it necessary to reiterate this aspect of the remedial scheme. The Court pronounced that: "the scope
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad,for breadthandflexibility are inherentin
equitable remedies."51 In a similar vein, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Brown 1 to rely upon district courts
to accomplish the task at hand because "we must of necessity rely to a large extent ...on the informed judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on
courts of appeals." 2 This is essentially an admission by
the Court that it is not the court in the best position to
assess the situation and to decide which remedial tools
work and which do not. A consequence of this admission is the willingness to defer to lower courts' findings
and decisions.
One final, but equally significant, area considered
by the Swann Court is the effect the defendants' actions
48Swann,

402 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). The Swann
Court also cited Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430(1968), in support ofthe proposition that trial courts should
have, and probably require, a great deal of latitude in the formulation of tools to remedy the intangible and tangible educational harms derived from unequal educational opportunities created by racial discrimination. Id. at 27. The Court in

Green noted: "[There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will
do the job in every case The matter must be assessed in light

of the circumstances present and the options available in each
instance." Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
49Swann, 402 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at
435.

Id. at 5.
Id.at 15 (emphasis added).

51

52

1d. at 28.

or inactions should have on the formulation of the remedy and ultimately, the dissolution of the orders and
decrees. The Court wholeheartedly agreed that the "objective is to dismantle the dual school system.""3 With
this goal in mind, the Court envisioned that once the
vestiges of public school segregation were eliminated,
federal courts would no longer play a role in guaranteeing that plaintiffs obtain equal educational opportunities. The Court noted, however, that this day cannot arrive until defendants in these cases cease engaging in the
"dilatory tactics" frequently encountered by the Court.I4
Additionally, the Court stated that "[t]he failure of local
authorities to meet their constitutional obligations aggravated the massive problem of converting from the
state-enforced discrimination of racially separate school
systems."5 The message sent by the Court was that defendants should be aware that adopting delay tactics or
continuing to resist complying with Brown I would only
result in the continued presence of the federal judiciary.
Furthermore, the language adopted by the Court indicates that it does not want to reward any defendant engaging in activity that lengthens the process and frustrates the plaintifis ability to be placed in their rightful
position.
The journey undertaken by the _Court to clarify
Brown I's mandate includes an important stop reflected
in its decision in Milliken v. Bradley. s Several important
remedial features were addressed by. the Court in this
case. First, the Court endorsed the low er court's adoption of a variety of educational programs designed to
address quality of education concerns that surfaced in
the quest to achieve the remedy's objective-educational
parity.5 7 The Court had no objection to creating and using these diverse programs as part of the trial court's
remedial package.58 Indeed, the triaLcourt's initiative
embodies the Swann Court's pronouncement that the
trial courts were free to create and devise a variety of
programs and measures in order to remedy the harm
done to the plaintiffs. 5 9 In endorsing the quality of education programs, the Court found that "[t]hese specific
531d.
54Id. at 13.
55- d. at 14 (emphasis added). This is precisely what the
Court observed in Green:'Thisdeliberate perpetuation of the
unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the
harm of such a system." Green, 391 U.S. at 438 (emphasis
added).
6433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter "Milliken II"].
171d. at 279-88.
5sd. at 291.
59 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (holding that "bizarre" remedies might be called for in order to provide the necessary
relief). See also Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (finding that Brown II
was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched duel systems
tempered by an awareness that complex and multifaceted problems could arise which would require time and flexibility for a
successful resolution).

educational remedies. . were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had
these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de
jure racial segregation." 0 Thus, the Court again emphasizes how critical it is that trial courts be allowed to
employ their historically flexible equitable powers to
ensure that defendants comply with Brown L
The Milliken II Court was faced with the novel issue of whether equitable orders issued in connection
with the Brown I mandate were tantamount to personal
judgments and thus violative of the Eleventh Amendment. 61 It has been well established that an order issued
by a court pursuant to its powers in equity is not a monetary judgment in disguise. This is true even when the
court's order requires the defendant to spend money.
This legal rule has been maintained by distinguishing
between a court order requiring or enjoining a particular act, and a judgment requiring the payment of money.
This principle applies even though the performance of
the action mandated by the equitable order might require a state defendant to use state funds to comply with
the order. 62 Applying this principle, the Milliken IICourt
rejected defendants' argument that this rule should not
apply because the equitable orders were substantively
monetary judgments barred by the Eleventh Amendment.63 In doing so, the Court noted:
The decree to share the future costs of educational
components in this case fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by
Edelman. That exception, which had its genesis in
ExparteYoung... permitsfederalcourts to enjoinstate
officials to conform their conduct to requirementsof federal law, notwithstandinga direct and substantial impact on the state treasurj."
Besides invalidating the Eleventh Amendment challenge to the orders issued to secure the elimination of

60Mi~liken

II, 433 U.S. at 282 (emphasis omitted).
Id.at 288-89. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." US. CONST.
amend. XI.
6 For example, if under the terms of an affirmative injunction a state is required to allow incarcerated inmates unlimited access to the law library, then in all likelihood the state
is going to have to expend funds in some manner-by increasing taxes, reallocating existing resources, etc.-in order to comply with the order.
63Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 289 (citations omitted).
6Id. at 289 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,667
(1974)(emphasis added)). Edelman reconfirmed Ex parte
61

disparate educational opportunities, this decision reflects
an important stance taken by the Court. While it acknowledged that the implementation of the remedies
necessary for compliance with Brown I's mandate could
affect the state's purse, the Court ultimately decided
that correcting the violation of the plaintiffs equal protection rights outweighed the State defendant's interests as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. Thus,
the Court struck a balance between these two competing principles. And given the gravity of the harm done
to the plaintiffs, it came down in favor of continuing to
champion the plaintiffs' interests.
Secondly, the defendant's federalism challenge of the
trial court's order was examined.6" The Court abruptly
dismissed this argument.66 One basis for this dismissal
arguably hinged on the view that the defendants had
waived any federalism claims by their actions. In Milliken
II, many years had passed since Brown I and the Detroit
public school system still had not eliminated the vestiges of racial segregation. This failure sustained the federal court's continuing duty to remedy the plaintiffs' situation. While this continued involvement potentially
implicates federalism concerns, 67 the perceived infringements on a state's rights can be eliminated or minimized
if the defendant acts in "good faith" in remedying the
situation and does so with all "deliberate speed."6 Un-

fortunately, typically the contrary is true.
Given the Court's admonishment in Swann about
the dilatory tactics used by some defendants to frustrate
efforts to formulate a remedy and to delay the implementation of the remedy,69 the curtness evident in the
Milliken II Court's response to the issue could be an attempt to "derail" future ploys to use federalism principles in support of objections to individual remedial
schemes or to justify noncompliance with a trial court's
orders. In sum, the Court is saying that it is the defendants' actions, or inaction, that causes any increases in
the federal court's involvement in remedying this situation. Thus, defendants will not be permitted to resort to
the Tenth Amendment and to cries of federalism as a

Youngrs, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception allowing the federal
judiciary to issue equitable orders forcing states to perform
tasks which might require the expenditure of state funds that
would have to come from its treasury, require a reallocation of
the state budget, or might even require the state to reconsider
its taxing policies to generate the revenue needed to be in compliance with the court's orders. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68.
6 Milliken II,
433 U.S. at 291.
66Id.
67 Federalism is implicated by the federal courts involvement in the creation of remedies, implementation of those
remedies, monitoring of compliance with those remedies, and
ultimately deciding whether defendants have complied to the
extent reasonably practicable.
68 Brown II,349 U.S. at 301.
69 Swann, 402 U.S. at 13-14.

last-ditch effort to stave off compliance. When examined holistically, the Court's message that defendant
States can waive their Tenth Amendment rights by viractions is akin to use of the unclean hands
tue of their
70
doctrine.
The position taken by the Milliken II Court on the
federalism issue reinforces its earlier stance regarding its
commitment to pursuing the goal of ensuring that plaintiffs in school desegregation cases are given an effective
remedy. Hence, the Court's no nonsense statements that
the principles of federalism "[are] not implicated by a
federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment,"7 and that as opposed to violating

principles of federalism "[t]he district court has, rather,
properly enforced the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment consistent with our prior holdings, and in
a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity of the
72
structure or functions of state and local governments."
Prior to Jenkins7 3 Freemanv. Pitts74 marked the final
stop of the desegregation jurisprudential journey. In some
ways, the decision in Freeman foreshadowed what happened in Jenkins. Probably the most significant aspect
of the Freemandecision was how it marked a shift in the
focal point of school desegregation litigation. Instead of
the traditional focus on ensuring that the plaintiffs received a remedy providing them with equal educational
opportunities, the Court paved the road to making the
defendant's interests paramount in the remedial scheme.
The FreemanCourt was concerned with the propriety of allowing partial or incremental compliance and,
thus, permitting a district court to relinquish its jurisdiction over components of the remedial scheme without requiring the defendant to prove full compliance
with achieving unitary status. 7s Ultimately, the Court

agreed with the district court and held: "[Iln the course
of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have
the authority to relinquish supervision and control of
school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations."76 One adverse consequence of this ruling is that

it shifts the primary concern from providing a meaningful and effective remedy for victims of segregation to
promoting the defendants' interest in eliminating federal judicial review that is meant to ensure the cessation
of constitutional rights violations. With this result, the
Court begins to reveal its new position toward the
70 The unclean hands doctrine is an affirmative defense
which prohibits one from receiving a remedy in equity if"he
goes into equity with unclean hands." See DAN B.DOBBS, LAw
OF REMEDIES § 2.4(2) (2d. ed. 1993).
" Milliken II,433 U.S. at 291 (citation omitted).
72Id.
73115

S. Ct. 2038 (1995).

U.S. 467 (1992).
Id. at 471.
76
Id. at 490.
74503
75

achievement and maintenance of equal educational opportunities.
III. MISSOURI v. JENKINS
After the preceding overview of the crucial jurisprudence in this area, one has to ask what happened in
Jenkins. Or, more accurately, what went wrong? The
overall thrust of the Court's decision shatters the core
of Brown v. Board of Education and the essential remedial directives contained in Brown II and its progeny.
The Court's objective in Jenkins-impeding compliance with Brown I-can be analyzed by placing the
opinion into three categories and examining them: (1)
the limitations placed on the remedial powers a court
exercises pursuant to its powers in equity; (2) the
reconfiguration of the competing interests; and (3) the
rewards given to defendants for resisting judicial orders.
Each category will be discussed individually.
In order to grasp the gravity of the Court's decision,
the best place to start is to examine the lower court's
decision and the remedial tools it selected to fulfill its
obligation to place plaintiffs' in their rightful positions.
A.

The Case and the Remedy

Prior to the decision in Brown I, "Missouri mandated
segregated schools for black and white children."77 It was
not until 1976 that Missouri's constitutional provision
providing for racial segregation in schools was rescinded.7
The Kansas City Missouri School District("KCMSD")
admitted that prior to 1977 it was not in compliance
with Brown L7 9 Thus, from 1954 until 1977 the Kansas
City School District maintained a dual school system in
direct violation of the mandate established in Brown I.
In 1977, several African-American school children and
the KCMSD brought an action against several federal
and state agencies, the State of Missouri, and surrounding suburban school districts. 8° Subsequently, in 1978,
the trial judge realigned the case making KCMSD a defendant."' KCMSD filed a cross-daim against the State
of Missouri for "its failure to eliminate the vestiges of its
prior dual school system."82 During the trial, the district
court dismissed all claims against the suburban school
districts and the U.S. Department of Health Education
andWelfare.' On September 17,1984 the district court
"found that there are still vestiges of the dual school
77Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F.Supp. 1485, 1490 (W.D. Mo.
1984), reh'g,639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d
657 78
(8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
Id. at 1490.
79
Id. at 1489.
8Id. at 1487-88.
81
Id.at 1487.
2
Id.at 1488.
8Id.

system in the KCMSD," and held in favor of the plaintiffs against KCMSD and the State of Missouri and in
favor of KCMSD against the State of Missouri. s4
As for the issue of an appropriate remedy, the district court noted that it "not only has the power but the
duty to enter a decree which will correct the continuing
effects of past discrimination as well as bar discrimination against blacks in the future.""' The court directed
the KCMSD and the State to "prepare a plan which
would establish a unitary school system within the
KCMSD."8 Eventually, the district court selected several remedial tools to implement the goal of the decreeto eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination in order to provide the equal educational opportunities mandated in Brown L The tools included: establishing magnet schools; developing and instituting quality of education programs; increasing the salaries of instructional and
noninstructional educational personnel; and embarking
87
on an aggressive capital improvements program.
The State of Missouri appealed the decision and
orders ofthe district court.8aThe Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the State of Missouri's objections
to two components of the district court's remedial
scheme that had been affimed by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. 89 Two issues were considered by
the Supreme Court: whether the trial court exceeded
its remedial authority by mandating that funds be allocated to increase the salaries of instructional and
noninstructional staff, 0 and whether the district court
could order the State of Missouri to continue funding
quality of education programs. 9' Finally, with the Court's
1995 decision to disallow the lower court's remedial
measures, 92 the State of Missouri obtained the relief it
wanted-the abrogation of its constitutional duty to
comply with the dictates established in Brown I which
allowed it to continue denying equal educational opportunities to African-American school children.
B. The Impact of Missouri v. Jenkins
8MId. at 1505.
85 d. (citation omitted)(emphasis
added).
86Id. at 1506.
87Jenkins
v. Missouri, 639 E Supp. 19, 24-56 (W.D. Missouri 1985).
mMissouri v.Jenkins, 115 S.Ct at 2042-46.
8Id. at 2041.
9Id. at 2046.
91Id.
at 2055.
92

Id.

93Programs

designed to improve the quality of education
were previously held to be an acceptable means of remedying
the wrong in educational racial discrimination cases Milliken
II,433 U.S. at 282-88.
91 The Court previously mentioned that it was appropriate for district courts to consider issues relating to the staffing
of educational facilities when fashioning an effective and meaningful remedy. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300. In Green, the Court

In addition to aiding the State of Missouri, the Supreme Court's decision produces several disturbing consequences. First, the decision places limits upon a trial
court's power to remedy a situation. This is particularly
disturbing because the Court's precedent since Brown I
has consistently stressed the integral and pivotal role that
district courts play in the desegregation process. Second, the Court appears to place little or no importance
upon the attainment of equal educational opportunities
for African-American school children. Third, the court
sends a message to defendants that they will ultimately
be rewarded for employing dilatory tactics that delay
the implementation of remedies that are needed to correct constitutionally infirmed situations. In addition to
its effect on school desegregation litigation, the ideas
embodied in the Court's opinion could have a detrimental impact on other areas of civil rights litigation.
1. Impairmentof The Judiciary'sPower to
Fashionan Effective andAdequate Equitable
Remedy
From a remedial perspective, the most devastating
aspect of the Court's decision in Jenkins is how it impairs the district courts' ability to exercise their equitable remedial powers. After assessing the educational
system in Kansas City, Missouri, the district court decided that continued funding of the quality of education programs, 93 and salary increases for instructional and
noninstructional educational staff 4 were integral components of the remedial scheme adopted to dismantle
the disparity in education.
In deciding to disallow the use of the lower court's
remedial tools in Jenkins, the Supreme Court has made
a disturbing change in the area of a trial court's ability to
design adequate and meaningful equitable remedies. To
begin with, courts have traditionally been bestowed with
broad and flexible equitable powers.95 The need for flexibility is understandable. When granting an equitable
specifically noted that the staffing of public educational facilities was an appropriate item for inclusion in a remedy designed
to eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination in public school
systems. Green, 391 U.S. at 435; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at
18-19 (commenting upon how it might be necessary for a court
to consider issues pertaining to support personnel when formulating a remedial scheme). Presumably, this would include
some consideration of the costs of employment. In order to
implement and sustain equal educational opportunities, the
necessary noninstructional personnel need to be compensated
in accordance with their professional peers. To do otherwise,
would not only severely hamper the implementation of the
remedy, but, in essence, would require these individuals to
bear the financial burden of being the only "good citizens" attempting to correct a constitutional wrong inflicted by the State
of Missouri.
9-See Hecht v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)(noting
that flexibility has been a tradition for "several hundred years"

remedy, it is imperative that a court be permitted to
prepare a remedy that will place plaintiffs in their rightful position.
Given the broad social implications of Brown I, the
Brown I Court envisioned that trial courts would need
to rely upon equity's "practical flexibility" in order to
formulate innovative remedial tools to "[solve] ... varied local school problems," and to "eliminat[e] ... a

variety of obstacles. 9 6 In Swann, the Court forcefully
reiterated its commitment to permitting trial courts to
devise a proper remedy by stating: "'There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there
is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every
case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance."9 7 In other words, the trial courts vested with the
authority and the responsibility to accomplish the task
of desegregation often need to resort to innovative and
creative means of effectuating the relief. The Court
clearly anticipated the need for creativity when it stated
that "[t]he remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in
some situations and may impose burdens on some; but
all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided.
.. to eliminate the dual school systems.98

By failing to adhere to precedent, the Jenkins Court
conveys a strong negative message to the judiciary that
the historical flexibility in developing appropriate equitable remedies is subject to erosion. This is particularly
true in the context of eliminating the vestiges of racial
discrimination in the public school systems so that the
plaintiffs can obtain an equal education.
The Court employs a variety of tools to support the
outcome in Jenkins and to depart from the practice of
relying upon trial courts to decide the appropriate form
of relief A dominant feature of the majority's opinion is
the interjection of the "interdistrict"versus "intradistrict"
argument as a means of invalidating the trial court's orders.9 9This distinction is merely a distraction and is more
likely a "red herring."
The Court correctly noted that during the liability
phase of the lower court's proceedings, the claims against
the suburban school districts were dismissed "[a]fter
hearing the presentation of plaintiffs evidence and beand is an important feature of a court's equitable power). See
also Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321 (1944)); Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280 n.15, 281.
6Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.

97Swann,

402 U.S. at 27 n.10 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at

439).
"I1d. at 28 (emphasis added).
"Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049-54.
'O°Jenkins v.Missouri, 593 F Supp. at 1488.
10ISee Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974)

(holding that to use a cross-district remedy it must be "shown
that there has been a constitutional violation within one dis-

fore any defense." 00 Therefore, any remedies fashioned
by the court would have to be intradistrict as opposed
to interdistrict. 0° The Jenkins Court stated:
The district court's remedial plan in this case, however, is not designed solely to redistribute the students within the KCMSD in order to eliminate racially identifiable schools within the KCMSD. Instead, its purpose is to attract nonminority students
from outside the KCMSD schools. But this
interdistrictgoal isbeyond the scope of the intradistrict
violation identified by the district court. 02
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that the
district court exceeded its equitable powers simply because its remedial scheme might have an "interdistrict"
impact, i.e. an impact on the dismissed defendants. If
anything, the district court's actions were consistent with
the Court'zsonstant acceptance of the fact that the remedies needed in this context would be broad'0 3 and could
undoubtedly have an ancillary impact on areas adjacent
to the city in which the school district is located.' 4 Specifically, since the Green Court held that orders entered
by district courts to remove the vestiges of racial discrimination in public school education "may impose
burdens on some,"105 it obviously contemplated that such
a situation might occur and considere*d it an acceptable
consequence of instituting the requisite relief Thus, disallowing the remedy ordered by the district court because of the impact such relief might have on others not
only disregards the Court's previous position on the issue, but also improperly impedes the trial court's ability
to create a meaningful remedy as mandated by Brown
II, and severely hinders the plaintiffi'ability to obtain
relief.
The majority's objection to the use of the lower
court's remedial powers is also based upon the provocative point that "the district court has set out on a program to create a school district that was equal to or superior to the surrounding [suburban school districts]."'06

The Court's statement reveals its position that African-American school children who have historically been
denied equal educational opportunities and have tried
to obtain an education in a school system riddled with
trict that produces a significant segregative effect in another
district'.
'02 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051 (emphasis in
original).
3
10
The Court was "aware that complex and multifaceted

problems would arise" which in turn would require the development of broad complex remedies. Green, 391 U.S. at 437;

see also Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
101 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298-99 (commenting on the
need to consider"local condition" in formulating a remedy and
"the elimination of a variety of obstades").
'0 Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
'06Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2050 (emphasis added).

the vestiges of racial discrimination do not have a right
to an education that is equal to school children in adjacent, but predominately white school districts. This position seems absurd given that the objective of Brown I
and its progeny was to ensure that these victimized children did indeed receive an equaleducation! Furthermore,
the use of such an argument to support the Court's conclusion that the district court exceeded its remedial powers directly contravenes years of precedent.
Approximately 45 years ago, the McLaurin Court
decided that a black graduate student's "training [was]
unequal to that of his classmates" 07 and consequently
held that he was entitled to "receive the same treatment
' 8 In
at the hands of the state as students of other races."'
Sweatt, the Court announced that the "petitioner may
claim his full constitutional right: legal education equivaent to that offered by the State to students of other
races."1°9The theme of parity in educational opportunities was again announced in Swann when the Court observed that the goal is for the defendants to "produce
schools of like quality.""10
Nowhere has the Court objected to a remedy designed to achieve equal educational opportunities for
the plaintiffs on the grounds that it was designed to
achieve the desired educational parity. By resorting to
this "definition" of equalityI the Court's decision sends
a confusing message to the district courts regarding the
proper exercise of their remedial powers in trying to
develop the necessary complex and multifaceted remedies. More importantly, the decision reveals the Court's
view on remedying the wrong suffered byAfrican-American school children due to years of institutionalized racism in this country.
The Court's contention regarding the consequence
of the lower court's actions ignores the fact that, even if
the terms of the remedy did provide the plaintiffs with
access to a "superior educational program," the district
court might have had a viable reason for adopting a remedial scheme that might be considered prophylactic." 2 For example, an exorbitant amount of time has
passed since the decision in Brown I and the KCMSD's
07McLaurin, 339
U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).
'I°Sd. at 642 (emphasis added).
109
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
10 Swann, 402 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).
S'Maybe the Court is suggesting that the express text of
the 14th Amendment which provides for "equal protection"
really112means something less than equal.
A prophylactic injunction is one that might actually
place the plaintiff in a position exceeding his or her rightful
position. This result may be necessary for several reasons. First,
it may be difficult to make a precise determination of the
plaintiff's rightful position. Therefore, rather than not provide
a remedy, it is permissible to grant more in order to be certain
that the plaintiff will be placed in his or her rightful position.
Second, there may be instances where the defendants behavior suggests that obtaining compliance could be difficult. As a

public school system continues to have vestiges of racial
discrimination.' 3 The court's orders could very well reflect its view that guaranteeing that plaintiffs are eventually placed in their rightful position requires resorting
to a remedy that grants more than what is needed to
place them in their rightful position.The Swann Court's
recognition that"[t]he failure of local authorities to meet
their obligations [has] aggravated the massive problem
of converting from the state-enforced
discrimination of
4
racially separate school systems,""1

In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor uses
another means to undermine the district court's tradi-

tional flexible power to fashion an adequate remedy.
Justice O'Connor advocates the invalidation of the
court's power to provide these remedies through the
development of a legal process argument. The core of
her argument is that the judiciary should not be the decision making body addressing this issue. 15 Instead, legislatures should be making these decisions." 6 As a general matter, Justice O'Connor is probably correct. She
seems to have forgotten, however, that a major impetus
for the decision in Brown I was the states' refusal to provide equal educational opportunities for African-American school children. Since it was impossible for the school
children to change the situation by resorting to the legislative process as they were ineligible to vote and since
their parents did not have a meaningful vote, the federal
courts were virtually the only decision making body that
could correct the situation. Now, Justice O'Connor advocates denying the victims their remedy based upon
the premise that the victimizers should be the ones to
decide the remedy!
In addition to placing limits on lower courts' remedial powers, the majority's opinion threatens to derail
the long standing deference given to the trial court's factual findings in cases seeking equitable remedies. In
Brown II, the Court acknowledged that given the district courts' "proximity to local conditions" they would
be in the best position to formulate the remedies and to
"consider whether the action of school authorities
constitute[d] good faith implementation of the governmeans of staving off problems in getting the plaintiff his or her
remedy, the court may order a prophylactic remedy. The underlying assumption is that even if the defendant "misbehaves,"
its more likely that the plaintiff will receive the remedy if more
than what is actually necessary has been ordered. See Dones,
supranote 70, at 645.
" Brown I was decided in 1954. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 483.
This litigation commenced in 1977. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. at 2042. It was not until 1985 that the State of Missouri was
held to have violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Jenkins
v. Missouri, 593 F.Supp. at 1485. It is now 1996 and Missouri
still has not satisfied the mandate issued in Brown I.
"4 Swann, 402 U.S. at 14.
Is Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
6
" Id. at 2060.

ing constitutional principles."' 7 Accordingly, the Swann
Court later decided that "we must of necessity rely to a
large extent... on the informed judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on courts of appeals."" 8
Given the tremendous duty entrusted to the district courts, along with the traditional deference given
to their findings of facts in equitable cases, it seems that,
at least prior to Jenkins,the Court wanted to ensure that
an additional amount of deference would be provided
to the district courts' desegregation decisions because of
the uniqueness of their relationships to the situations
and the importance of the issues." 9 Despite the existence of substantial precedent regarding the proper degree of deference that should be afforded to district
courts formulating remedies in school desegregation
cases, the current Supreme Court has opted to essentially supplant the district court's findings and understanding of the situation in the Kansas City public school
system. 120 This approach is revealing because it is contrary to the approach taken in Freemanwhere the Court
went to great lengths to uphold and support the district
court's findings.' 2 ' The Court's not so subtle vacillation
on when to accept the findings of fact that flow from a
district court's unique understanding of the case appears
to reflect a policy of supporting those cases that coincide with the Court's agenda of subjugating the rights
of African-American public school children to the local
governmental interest of controlling school districts.
Besides its obvious impact on desegregation litigation, it warrants noting the dangerous repercussions
Jenkins could have if it is used as precedent in other areas of civil rights litigation. Structural injunctions are
frequently used in cases involving prisoners' conditions
of confinement and the conditions of facilities for the
mentally disabled.12 Unfortunately, the opinion in
Jenkins reveals the Court's willingness to erode the trial
court's ability to fashion adequate remedies in cases involving violation of the rights of essentially powerless or
disenfranchised individuals. Given this message, defendants embroiled in public law litigation might be "encouraged" to engage in certain tactics like "coercing"
plaintiffs to enter consent decrees that do not provide
plaintiffs with an adequate remedy and engaging in behavior designed to delay complying with the remedies
imposed by the court because of the realization that the
decision in this case sets a favorable precedent for arguing that the trial court exceeded its remedial powers in
equity. Essentially, if the defendants can "hold out," they
II, 349 U.S. at 299.
11Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
"i'Brown

8

"

9

See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (acknowledging that if"the

school authorities [default on] their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion
a remedy that will assure a unitary school system,").
'20 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049-56.
121Freeman v.Pitts, 503 U.S. at 467, 492-99 (1992).

probably can use Jenkins to make the case go away. At a
minimum, they could use it to obtain a more favorable
decree that does not provide the relief to which the plaintiffs are truly entitled. Thus, the core of the message
sent by the Supreme Court to defendants litigating public
structural reform cases is dear: drag your feet, and don't
comply. If the institution involved performs what is traditionally considered a local governmental function, such
as administering a prison system, it will probably benefit from these tactics because the Supreme Court will
eventually come to its rescue by declaring that the district court exceeded it's remedial powers.
Another consequence of the message sent by the
Court is the potential unwarranted restraint it could place
on the judiciary. Now when confronted with a public
law litigation case, it would not be surprising to see the
judiciary proceed hesitantly and with extreme caution
because of the threat posed by the decision in Jenkins
that the defendants' challenge to its remedy will ultimately be accepted by the Court. Perhaps even more
damaging is that district courts might be deterred from
finding liability if they know they could ultimately be
hindered in their quest to develop and implement effective remedies. This could happen in situations where
the defendants' attitude and comportment during the
pretrial and trial proceedings make using a prophylactic
injunction necessary. So, instead of encouraging court's
to correct pervasive systemic constitutional wrongs,
Jenkins serves to deter the judiciary from exercising its
equitable remedial powers when confronted with such
cases.
If the trial court is feeling the heat, then imagine
the pressure placed on plaintiffs' counsel in public law
cases. Jenkins sends the message that the Supreme Court
is willing to interfere with the trial court's traditionally
broad and flexible equitable remedial powers. This willingness to interfere will directly influence counsel's decision regarding whether to commence litigation. If it is
likely that a complex and possibly "intrusive" decree is
required and the Court is informing the trial judges that
they should exercise restraint in doing so, then counsel
are going to be just as hesitant about pursuing these cases.
Ultimately, Jenkins sends a signal that the Court is not
concerned about the following: the harm done to certain plaintiffs; the fact that these plaintiffs may not receive the relief to which they are entitled; that the judiciary may be deterred from doing its job; and that potential plaintiffs' counsel might be deterred from pursuing cases on behalf of certain classes of individuals who
122 See generallyToussaint

v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1991)(conditions of confinement in the administrative
segregation housing units at severil California prisons); Madrid
v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.Cal. 1995)(conditions of
confinement at the security housing unit at Pelican Bay);
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 . Supp. 1282 (E.D.Cal.
chiatric care at California penal facilities).
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have the misfortune to be in situations where their rights
are violated by states or other governmental entities.
2. The Subjugation of the Plaintiffs' Interestsin
Equal Education Litigation
The majority opinion in Jenkins contains another
interesting twist. This is derived from the emphasis
placed upon the costs associated with the implementa-3
tion and maintenance of the district court's remedy.'
This reveals a not too subtle attempt to reintroduce two
issues previously decided in favor of plaintiffs in school
desegregation cases: whether the prospective remedy
violates the Eleventh Amendment; and whether judicial involvement in such matters violates the Tenth
Amendment and the general principles of federalism.
Both issues were considered and rejected by the Court
in Milliken I.124
In addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue, the
Milliken II Court held that although the prospective relief granted to achieve the goal of equal educational opportunities might require the defendant to expend state
treasury funds, since the relief was not a monetary damage award "federal courts [can] enjoin state officials to
conform their conduct to requirements of federal law,
notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the
state treasury."'2 In the same case, the Court entertained
a Tenth Amendment federalism challenge and perfuncof these
torily rejected it. 2 6 Despite the prior2resolution
7
issues, the Court reintroduces them.
The real impetus for the Court's discussion of the
costs associated with the remedial scheme is not per se
federalism and the propriety of using state treasury funds
to comply with court orders. Instead, at the core of this
discussion is the Court's decision to reconfigure the hierarchy of interests involved in cases of this nature. Previously, it had been accepted that the plaintiffs' interests were the focal point of the litigation and the ensuing remedy.' Brown II initially established the hierarchy of interests: "[a]t stake is the personalinterestof the
plaintiffs."'29 Green reaffirmed the Court's decision to
23

Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043-44, 2054.
II, 433 U.S. at 288-91.
1Isd. at 289 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also
supra p. 30.
discussion
26
1 Id. at 291.
27
1 See Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2054-56 (federalism issue); id. at 2043-45(Eleventh Amendment issue). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion which uses a legal process
rationale to invalidate the District Court's orders also relies
of federalism. Id. at 2060-61.
upon 2 principles
8
' See supra at pp. 27-28.
'2 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
130 Green, 391 U.S. at 436 (citing Brown II, 349 U.S. at
300).31
Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 274.
' 24Milliken

balance the interests in this manner.1 30 In Milliken II, the
court again took the position previously taken by the
Court by holding that the plaintiffs' interests in obtaining the equal education to which they were deemed
entitled outweighed the defendants' concern with regaining total control of the school system.' 3 ' The Milliken
II Court's rejection of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment challenges, which reflected the state's interest, reconfirmed the Court's decision to place the plaintiffs'
interests before those of the defendants. Until its decision in Jenkins, the Supreme Court has never wavered
from the steadfast position that litigation involving issues pertaining to equal educational opportunities should
focus on the African-American school children's rights
because "the ultimate objective of the remedy is to make
whole the victims of unlawful conduct."'132 The Court's
reference to the costs expended and to be expended by
the State of Missouri and the emphasis placed on the
school system's interests, however, supports the conclusion that the current Court has decided to alter the historical hierarchy of rights. Evidently, the Court is more
concerned with how much it has and will cost the State
of Missouri to remedy the situation than it is with the
fact that Missouri was found to have violated the plaintiffs' rights by not providing equal educational opportunities for more than 40 years after the decision in Brown
LThis can only have devastating effects on securing equal
education opportunities for African-American children.
3. RewardingImproperBehavior
Brown II required remedying the inequality in the
public school systems with "all deliberate speed." 33 The
defendants were also directed "[to] make a prompt...
start towards full compliance" with the decision in Brown
LN Lastly, the Court said that "the vitality of [Brown
I's] constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement with them."13 Despite
these admonitions, the Court anticipated that the defendants' attitudes might cause some delay to occur before equal education was available to all students attend32

Id. at 280. I do not suggest that the responsibility for
public school systems does not belong with the states and with
the local school boards. I only suggest that the Court has decided that they must comply with Brown I's mandate and that
the federal judiciary is the body vested with this responsibility. Approximately ten years have passed since the District
Court found the State of Missouri liable for violating the plaintiffs' rights. Various programs pursuant to the court's orders
have been implemented, and the District Court has already
considered timelines for the cessation of the supervision necessary to ensure that plaintiffs obtain their remedy. See Brief
of Respondent, KCMSD, 1994 WL 690211, at * 17, Missouri
v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
133Brown II,349 U.S. at 301.
I'Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
135Id.

ing public schools. 36 Although the Court was willing to
allow some acceptable degree of delay, it advised defendants to exercise good faith in creating and performing
the necessary corrective measures. 37 The question remained as to what the Court considered an acceptable
delay.
The Greencase sheds light on the issue of what constitutes acceptable delay. Green was decided in 1968,131
fourteen years after the 1954 decision in Brown L After
the School Board's failed to dismantle the discriminatory school system during this extended period, the
Court declared that "such delays are no longer tolerable."' ns Thus, it is logical to assume that fourteen years
is an unacceptable delay in remedying the constitutional
harm done to the plaintiffs. The decisions in Green and
Swann also reinforce the message to defendants in school
desegregation cases that delays in establishing equal educational opportunities for the plaintiffs were inexcusable and highly suggestive of"dilatory tactics""40 and"may
141
indicate a lack of good faith."
Four decades have passed since Brown v. Board of
Educationwas decided, and the Kansas City School District still does not provide equal educational opportunities to African-American school children. Further, more
than ten years have elapsed since the district court found
Missouri liable for violating the equal protection clause
because it had denied an equal education to black children attending public school in Kansas City. The defendant might be able to proffer reasons for its delay, but it
is highly unlikely that a "delay" of forty one years is acceptable. This seems a reasonable conclusion given that
the Court in Green was incensed after only ten years
had passed between the decision
in Brown ITand the
142
defendant's first remedial plan.
The defendant's delay in complying with Brown I
"can only have compounded the harm"' 43 suffered by
the plaintiffs. This failure can only have "aggravated the
massive problem of converting from the state-enforced
discrimination of racially separate school systems."' 44 It
also brings into question the sincerity of the State of
Missouri's "good faith" efforts to remedy the harm compounded by its failure to satisfy Brown I. Given what
can undoubtedly be construed as an unacceptable delay
by the State in complying with Brown I that compounded

136The Court in Brown H1 noted that"the courts may find
that additional time is necessary to carry out the [Brown 1]
ruling in an effective manner." Brown 11,349 U.S. at 300.
13 7 Id.

138 Green,

391 U.S. at 430.
at 438.
140Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
'41
Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
1Id. at 438-39.
143Id.at 438.
' 44 Swann, 402 U.S. at 14.
'45Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
19Id.

the harm sustained by the plaintiffs and the questions
these considerations raise regarding the propriety of the
State's motivation, it seems improper to have rejected
the district court's remedial orders, even if they are prophylactic. The Court's ruling in Jenkins, however, not
only deprived the plaintiffs of components of a remedial scheme designed to address the compounded harm
caused by the defendant's refusal to adhere to Brown I's
dictates, but it also condones, or rewards, such activity
that flagrantly defies the Court's instructions to act with
"good faith compliance," 45 and to do so "with all delib46
erate speed."'
Why would the Court bestow such a benefit upon
a defendant in a school desegregation case where the
ultimate objective is to eliminate the vestiges of racial
discrimination which make it impossible for the plaintiffs to obtain an education equivalent to that received
by children in other school districts?1 47 Rewarding activity that is tantamount to the continued violation of a
constitutional right seems counterintuitive. However, the
Court must have had a reason for proceeding with this
course of action. Perhaps it is that identified earlier: its
decision to realign the interests involved by placing those
of the victims last and those of the victimizer first.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where does the Court's decision. in Jenkins leave
us? For one thing, the decision certainly hinders the district courts' ability to fashion the necessary schemes to
remedy school inequality situations with which they are
intimately familiar. The same can be said for remedying
wrongs for other civil rights violations if this portion of
the decision is applied to other contexts. Equally disturbing is the Court's decision to reconfigure the interests in equal educational opportunity litigation that had
been entrenched for over 45 years. Now the victims'
interests occupy the final position on the list . It is a shame
that the Court decided to bestow numerous benefits
upon defendants in this type of litigation. The decision
provides defendants with a tool they can use to avoid
the imposition of what they would perceive as burdensome orders in structural injunction cases. It can also aid
defendants in avoiding any involvement in this specific

46
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Id.
One might argue that the federalism concerns are at

the forefront of the Court's decision. See Missouri v.Jenkins,
115 S.Ct. at 2043-47, 2054-56. However, any federalism concers are exacerbated by the defendant's delay or resistance to
act in accordance with a constitutional mandate issued by the
United States Supreme Court. Now the Supreme Court is
permitting the State of Missouri to latch onto its federalism
concerns as a means of avoiding compliance with Brown I, or
reducing what is actually necessary for it to comply with Brown
I's mandate. It seems absurd to allow a party to benefit from a
situation it is at least partially responsible for creating.

type of litigation and potentially in other types of civil
rights cases. Perhaps what is most frightening is the tacit
approval of behavior that delays or frustrates the deliverance of the remedy to which the plaintiffs were deemed
entitled.
The Court seems to have forgotten that an adjudged
wrong without a remedy does not accomplish much.
Maybe what the Court actually wants is for plaintiffs in

certain types of cases, such as equal educational opportunity cases, to realize that they are foreclosed from receiving "justice"from the "justice system." Fraught with
frustration, the plaintiffs will throw their hands up and
opt not to pursue their claims. The consequence is that
the Court will no longer have to be bothered by these
disfavored suits.

